λμ betRISE
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Whole book open + closed
Closed realized · locked
Open at risk right now
Desk
Read it top down: the live flow, then what needs a decision, then the
open risk book and the loss distribution behind it, then margin performance. Monitoring
above, review below — the panels that say act now come before the ones that
say how did we do. Click any match, selection or bar to open the inspector.
Needs attention ranked by limit use all alerts ›
Book concentration
Margin on the book you are carrying every slip struck
theoretical
expected
Margin on the book that has closed only the slips that have settled · all three on one base
Theoretical and expected are free; realized is not. The first
two are running aggregates over arrival time — neither has a result in it —
so they are exact and always drawn. Realised needs the clock walked, and walking the
clock reassociates the engine’s calibration at the 1e-15 level: every value still
prints the same, but it is not bit-identical, and a measurement that silently perturbs
the book it is measuring is not something this console does. So the history line is
traced on request.
Traced on a cleared board. A manual settlement carries no
timestamp, so replaying the clock with one applied would show matches decided before
they kicked off. This is the natural history of the book, not the history plus
whatever is currently on screen. The dotted vertical is where the clock is standing.
Expected liability
Where the number comes from. Every bar is exact and additive — they sum to the book total, so this is the whole liability decomposed, not a sample of it.
By contribution exact · additiveopen book only
eventturnover
net exp.P(loss)
Red is the probability-weighted value of every losing outcome, green the winning ones; the marker is the net. Sorted by downside, because turnover and danger are different lists. Open book only — money already settled is booked as realized P&L and has no expected liability left to decompose. Click a row to inspect the match.
Tail contribution simulated · additive · ±s.e.
Exposure lineage exact · additive
uncoupled — singles on this focal
coupled — carried with another match
node area ÷ ribbon width ∝ apportioned contribution
hollow node = too small to size honestly
hover for the numbers
| Carried by | Slips | Apportioned | Share | Co-carried |
|---|
carried by multis
carried by singles
build-up across the card
Alerts & limits
Exposures ranked against their ceilings, not by size — and against the right ceiling. A big number inside its limit is not a problem; a mid-size one over its limit is; and a huge number at 1% is a cheque you must be able to write, not a position you must trade out of.
Top exposures worst open liabilities
| Match | Sel. | Market | Odds · prob | Liability · expected | Limit use | Inspect · trace it |
|---|
Scenarios & what-if
Move the clock, replay the card, or force outcomes across the whole book. Everything is reversible — the header shows when a scenario is applied.
Card clock 72h pre-match window
Rewind · replay
Reverse scenario start from the outcome, find the card
The search space is not the grid. A card of
sixteen matches has more scorelines than can be enumerated, but the book's P&L does not
depend on the scoreline — it depends on which selections won. Two scorelines that
grade every market the same way are the same world to this book, so the space to search
is the set of achievable settlement signatures per block, which is small. That
collapse is exact, not an approximation.
Two different questions. The worst card is a coordinate descent:
sweep one block at a time, take whichever signature hurts most, repeat until nothing
moves. Sweeping matters because multis couple matches together and one pass is not
enough. The second search is the one a trading director actually asks — not
what is the worst case but what is the most ordinary-looking Saturday that
costs me this much — so it starts from the most likely card and repeatedly
makes the change with the best ratio of loss bought to probability spent.
Both are local searches and are labelled as such. Coordinate
descent finds a local worst, not a proven global one. On a card small enough to
enumerate exhaustively the two agree, which is the gate this version ships with; on a
full card it is a strong lower bound on the damage, not a certificate.
Force outcomes across the book reversible
Forcing an outcome conditions the latent grid onto the surviving state space rather than collapsing it to a point, so partially settled matches keep pricing correctly on the markets still open.
Why the two rows are different. The selects above force one
market across the card. That is how a trader thinks and it is the right control
for a what-if, but a market is an instrument: settling instruments one at a time can
leave the underlying state undetermined, and the match stays open even though every
chip on its row has been pressed. The row below settles from a state instead
— one achievable final score and tie-break per block, every market read off it,
including correct score and margin, which have too many selections to sit on a row.
That is the scenario definition a market risk system uses: shock the factors, revalue
everything. It is complete by construction, and the residual is asserted on screen
rather than assumed.
Model & calibration
The engine room. One latent state per match — four coupled grids for football, a regulation scoreline plus a tie-break channel for ice hockey — calibrated to the probabilities the platform already holds, or recovered from quoted odds where it does not. betRISE never sees a price book.
Latent grids marginals in, joint distribution out Match:
Four latent blocks per match. The goals grid (home×away goals) spans 1X2, double chance, O/U and BTTS. The corners grid spans the corner totals, most corners and the corner handicap. The shots and shots on target grids span their totals and most-shots markets. Correlation inside each block is exact, and the blocks are coupled to each other rather than combined as independent — they share two factors and are tied on the latent scale by a Gaussian copula. The cross-block error above is what treating them as independent would cost instead.
Margin discovery recovered from the flow, not configured
| Market group | Measurable | Coverage | Recovered | Configured | Error | Drift |
|---|
This is the production shape. An operator configures margin in
their own platform and betRISE never sees the configuration — it sees the flow. The
estimator is the over-round itself: for a market whose selections partition the outcome
space, the booked probabilities sum to it. The Configured column exists only here,
in the demo, so the recovery can be checked against the truth. On a real feed there is
nothing to check it against, which is exactly why the coverage and drift columns matter.
Two kinds of market cannot be read this way, and both were found by
measuring. Fold sources — double chance covers the outcome space twice,
so summing 1X, 12 and X2 double-counts; included, the three-way group recovered 1.229
against a configured 1.060. The engine already knew:
ingest() skips fold
sources when calibrating, for the same reason. Whole lines carry push mass, so
their selections sum to less than one — Asian 2.0 covers 0.714 of the space. Both
are excluded and counted rather than quietly averaged in.Coverage is the honest constraint. betRISE learns a market's
prices only from bets struck on it, so a market is measurable only once the flow has
revealed every selection. Two-way markets fill quickly; a correct score with
twenty-two selections almost never does. Drift is the widest gap in snapshots
between the observations that make up one estimate: prices move across the window, so a
market assembled from distant observations carries that movement in its over-round.
What this engine does not price, and why the boundary
Every market above is a function of a final
state, which is what makes it a projection of a grid and what makes correlated
exposure computable rather than asserted. A market that settles on the order or the
timing of events is a different object. Naming them is not a disclaimer: it is the
line that separates what has been built from what would need a within-game process
model, and it is the same line tennis sits on.
| Not priced from the grid | Why |
|---|
Contribution to Expected Shortfall simulated three limits, on screen
The book's ES 95% is one number and the console
splits it by match. The split is the Euler allocation, which for expected
shortfall is a conditional expectation — a match's average P&L across the
book's worst 5% of draws — and it is the split rather than one of the
alternatives because it is the only one that adds up: expected shortfall is
homogeneous of degree one, so by Euler's theorem the contributions sum to the total
exactly. That is asserted on every build, not assumed.
| Limit | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Zero is not safe | A match that never lands in the book's worst 5% contributes exactly zero, however much it could lose on its own. This is the known defect of every threshold allocation — Bodoff's objection is that loss scenarios below the threshold use capital and are allocated none of it — and it is mitigated rather than solved: the standalone column beside every contribution is what that match can lose on its own bad day, and the diversification index is the ratio of the two. |
| It carries a standard error | A contribution is a mean over the tail sample alone — 750 draws of 15,000 at the default — not over every draw. Expected shortfall already needs a larger sample than VaR for the same accuracy; a contribution needs more again. Every figure is printed with its ± and none is quoted to more precision than that supports. Raising Monte-Carlo samples above tightens them. |
| Two apportionment bases, on purpose | A multi's P&L is split across its legs by net-win weights. Realised and pending P&L use every leg, because a settled leg did contribute its share of what was made. Tail contribution uses the open legs only, because scaling exposure to a match that has already resolved changes the draw not at all — its contribution is identically zero. Different questions, different bases; both are correct for their own question and neither is correct for the other's. |
Realised money never enters a contribution. The simulation walks only
open slips, and the book's banked P&L is added identically to every draw — a
constant cannot change which draws are in the tail and is never split across matches. It
appears on exactly one line, the total, where the exposure page reconciles
still at risk + banked = ES 95%. Ceilings are set on the still-at-risk figure, so
banking a profit on one match cannot loosen the tail ceiling on another.
The counterfactual in the event inspector — what the tail would
be if this match had never been written — is a different measure and is offered
as a button rather than a column for two reasons: it costs a full simulation per match,
and it does not add up, because removing a match also removes the diversification it was
giving everything else.
Singles and multis simulated one book, decomposed
Operators run separate ceilings for singles
and multis at every level — selection, market, event, competition, sport,
book. betRISE deliberately does not, with one exception, and the reasoning is worth
having on screen because it is the opposite of the industry's.
| Where | What betRISE does, and why |
|---|---|
| Risk measures expected liability, downside, tail |
Decomposed, never split. A multi's risk sits on the same matches as the singles — the console apportions it there and the sums reconcile exactly — so "the multi book" is not a book, it is a way of arriving at exposure that is already counted where it lands. Splitting the ceilings would also import the problem the industry grid has: exposure limits multiply at higher levels of aggregation, which is what two bet types times six levels is, while a unified measure gives one limit that works at every level. |
| Payout ceilings solvency, not risk |
Split, at selection level. The worst single on this card pays €1,513; the worst slip of any kind pays €62,917. One ceiling across a 42× gap is either too loose to bind on a single or too tight to allow normal multi business. Same argument the Basel large-exposures framework makes for keeping a crude single-counterparty cap beside risk-based capital: a portfolio measure is an average over everything and will not see the one position that hurts on its own. |
| Bet-type concentration | One ceiling on a ratio, replacing what a second grid of amounts would have done. Not how much turnover is in multis — that tells you almost nothing — but how much of the tail sits in one half of the book, so drift in that ratio raises its hand. |
What the split actually shows. Singles hold a diversification
index near 0.2–0.4 all card — a hundred singles on different matches largely
cancel — while multis run 0.95 to 0.99 under every mix tested: the multi
book is the tail. And the ratio moves. As multis accumulate won legs their
surviving stake gets more leveraged and more correlated, so singles' share of the tail
falls steadily through the evening while their turnover share barely moves. A pair of
ceilings set before kick-off is watching a number that changes by a factor of five
during the card.
And it is concentration, not volume. Reaching a 65/35 turnover
split with more small singles puts singles at about a tenth of the tail;
reaching the same split by making the existing singles two and a half times bigger
puts them at a third. Same ratio, four times the risk. That is why the instrument
that controls a singles book is a payout cap and not a risk limit — it
caps the thing that actually drives the danger.
Method changes propagate through the whole book
betRISE de-margins with Profile B only
Unused when the betslip carries the platform's fair probability. Where it does not: net-win stable is parameter-free, round-trips to machine precision, and inverts a 50-way market as cleanly as a 2-way.
Monte-Carlo samples
Used for VaR, ES and the per-match ES contributions. The expected liability is closed-form and cross-checked against the draw. Raising this tightens the standard error on every contribution, which is a mean over the worst 5% of these draws rather than over all of them.
Calibration slack
0 when the probabilities are supplied or the source's pricing method is known. Raise it when de-margining an unknown third-party feed.
0.0
Source prices with
Stand-in for the operator feed betRISE is reading. Changing it regenerates the book.
Setup
Operator configuration. Set once, not per session — unlike the book generator, which is demo data and lives in the drawer.
Exposure limits drives every alert
Expected liability · selection ranks the worklist
Liability weighted by the probability it lands. This is the economic control: what the position costs, not what it could cost.
Expected downside · market
Sum of liability × probability over the outcomes that lose. The same measure as event downside, one level down.
Max payout · selection a ceiling, not a risk measure
Most you can be asked to hand over on one selection. Independent of probability on purpose: if it lands you owe it whatever the price said.
Max payout · selection · singles only the one ceiling that splits by bet type
The same measure as the ceiling above, over the singles book alone. This is the only place betRISE splits a ceiling by bet type, and it is deliberate: on the reference card the worst single pays €1,513 while the worst slip of any kind pays €62,917, a factor of 42, so one ceiling across both is either too loose to ever bind on a single or too tight to allow normal multi business. It is the same argument the Basel large-exposures framework makes for keeping a crude single-counterparty cap beside risk-based capital — a portfolio measure is an average over everything and will not see the one position that hurts on its own. The risk ceilings are not split, because a multi's risk sits on the same matches as the singles and betRISE decomposes it there instead.
Max payout · market
Worst single outcome across a market's selections.
Plausibility floor payout scopes only
A payout breach under this probability is tagged longshot and sorted to the bottom of the worklist — still counted, never hidden. Without it the list ranks by lottery-ticket size: measured on three books, the median probability of a firing payout alert was under 3%, and four of the top five rows were correct score. With a hard cut-off instead of a demotion the same books go from four alerts to one, which is the opposite failure. 2.5% is a starting point, not a standard.
%
Event downside
Probability-weighted downside over the joint grids for one match.
Event contribution to ES 95% simulated
Ceiling on how much ONE match contributes to the book's expected shortfall — its average P&L across the worst 5% of book outcomes, which is the Euler allocation of ES and therefore sums across matches to the tail itself. Every other event-level ceiling here is a ceiling on an average; this is the only one on the tail, and the two rank differently enough that the worst expected liability on a card is routinely not the worst tail contributor. Set on the open-risk basis: realised money is a constant in every draw and is excluded from both sides, so banking a profit elsewhere cannot loosen this ceiling. The figure carries a standard error because it is a mean over the tail sample, not over every draw.
Book VaR 95%
Ceiling on the 95th-percentile loss across the whole open book.
Bet-type concentration simulated a share, not an amount
Largest share of the book's tail sitting in one bet type. Not turnover — turnover tells you almost nothing here. On the reference card singles are roughly half the money and, depending on how concentrated their stakes are, between 3% and 38% of the worst 5% of outcomes; multis run a diversification index of 0.95 to 0.99 under every mix tested, which is to say the multi book is the tail. This ceiling exists so that drift in that ratio raises its hand, and it replaces what a second grid of single/multi risk ceilings would have done — one number on a ratio instead of twelve on amounts.
%
Coupling concentration a share, not an amount
Largest share of one match's expected liability that is carried by slips also riding on a single other match. The only ceiling here that is a percentage, because the risk is concentration rather than size. Judged against an effective figure: the base share scaled up by as much as 50% when the coupled exposure sits in one market on the other match rather than spread across several, since one outcome then resolves all of it together. The scaling is a judgement, and both figures are always shown.
%
Warning threshold
Utilisation at which an exposure turns amber.
75%
Hierarchical, the way a trading desk sets them: selection inside market inside event inside book. Utilisation is tracked at every level at once, so a book that is comfortable overall still surfaces the one selection that is not. Coupling concentration sits outside that nesting on purpose: it is not a bigger container, it is a different question, and it is the only one here that a conventional screen cannot compute at all.
And one that is neither. Event contribution to ES 95% is not a bigger or smaller container than the ceilings around it — it is the same container, the match, measured in the tail instead of in the mean. It exists because the two orderings disagree, and they disagree at the top. On the reference card the worst match by event downside — the ceiling directly above this one — is not the worst match in the tail, and the two rankings correlate at ρ = 0.59; against the expected liability decomposition on the exposure page the correlation falls to ρ = 0.22. The match that led the tail carried 32% of the whole open tail on its own while sitting third by expected liability. A desk that only watches the mean does not see that match until the night it happens. Both numbers are properties of one synthetic card, not constants — what is structural is that a mean and a tail rank differently, not by how much.
Two families, deliberately. The expected ceilings are risk measures — liability weighted by whether it happens — and they rank the worklist. The payout ceilings are solvency controls and answer a different question: can this book pay. A desk runs both, because a notional cap does not care how unlikely the outcome was. Event downside, book VaR and coupling concentration were already probability-weighted; selection and market were the two that were not, which is why the worklist used to open on correct-score longshots.
Feed & ingestion
Betslip profile
A: the record carries the platform's fair probability, so betRISE uses it directly and no margin is stripped. B: odds only, betRISE recovers the probability itself. A is the common case on any platform that supports cash-out. The grids are calibrated either way, because a joint distribution cannot be read off marginals.
Alert routing
Where breaches are pushed.
Auto-suspend on breach
Pull the selection when it crosses its ceiling.
Base currency
Only the betslip profile and the limits are wired in this proof of concept. The rest is shown to place the settings that a live deployment needs, not to imply they are implemented.
betRISE risk console v72 · Logomath Analytics · synthetic data, no operator feed · figures illustrative